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x. FED. RuLFs CiV. PROC. (938).
Rule 2: "One Form of Action. There shall be
one form of action to be known as 'civil action'."
Rule i0 (b) : "Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded
upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth."
Rule 38: "Jury Trial of Right.
"(a). Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate.
"(b). Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right
by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than io days. after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.
"(c). Same: Specification of Issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury
for all the issues sci triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the
issues, any other party within io days after service of the demand or such lesser time
as the court may order, may. serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of
the issues of fact in the action.
(645)
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trial.2

He criticizes the view that under the Rules law and equity,

in their pleading aspects, have been "merged", rather than merely
"united"; warns of the danger of "mergeritis", i. e., "the communism of
legal and equitable remedies and the insidious destroyer of constitutional
jury rights"; and indicates that "Members of law faculties have contracted the disease, and are passing it on to students." 3
One of the authors of the present article is named as a "merger
advocate". 4 Both of us are in the class of. those who have "contracted
the disease" and "are passing it on to students". We enter a defense.
I. TE PERSPECTIVE
Apparently "mergeritis" refers to the view that the problem of
jury trial need not be settled at the pleading or pre-trial stages of the
procedure and that these steps should be freed from any restrictions of
historical form in fulfilling their three functions of telling the story,
.narowling the issues, and reve-aing the facts.,
rfso
cak~
warns that "We should not blind ourselves to the seriousness of the
evil" 5-mergeritis.
But before considering the effect of pleading under
one form of action upon the determination of the right to jury trial, let
us get into its proper perspective the entire "jury-trial problem". 6
The matter may be placed into perspective in two ways: first,
quantitatively-the number of cases in which a demand for jury trial
may be expected (the only cases in which a jury trial determination will
be in order); and second, qualitatively-the factors which contribute
to any difficulty in this determination.
Fortunately, statistics are available for the first task. In 1934 the
American Law Institute completed a survey of the civil cases for over
three years in thirteen district courts. 7 In 1937 the Yale Law School
published a study of the cases for almost ten years in various superior
courts in Connecticut.
As is indicated in the latter study, such
"..data may not always be in the exact form desired; but it is even
"(d). Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule
and to file it as required by Rule 5 (d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A
demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of the parties."
2. McCaskill, Jiry Demands in the New FederalProcedure (194o) 88 U. OF PA.

L. REV. 315.

3. Id. at 329-330.

4. Id. at 317, n.6, referring to the writings of Judge Clark and Professor Moore
(see p. 651 infra), and to PIKFE CASES ON NEW FEDERAL AND CODE PROCEDURE (1939).
5. Id. at 330.

6. "Jury-trial problem", as used throughout this article, refers to any difficulty
which may exist in determining the extent of the right to jury trial in a given case
under the united administration of law and equity.
7. AMERICAN LAW INsTiTuTF, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
-Part II,Civil Cases (1939).
8. This survey was under the direction of Dean (now Circuit Judge) Clark and
Professor Shulman: LAw ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937).
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more true that persons with specific problems cannot always start from
scratch". 9 Because of the wide variety of conditions in the thirteen
districts surveyed, the American Law Institute study is useful to gauge
the percentage of jury trials under the new Federal Rules; but some
adjustment may be necessary since that study covers a period during
which jury waiver was not automatic in the federal courts and there
was a divided administration of law and equity. But with respect to
any necessary adjustment the Connecticut figures will be helpful since
in that state during the period covered by the figures, there was (and
is at present) a united administration of law and equity and provision
for waiver of jury trial by failure to demand it 10-as under Federal
Rule 38 (b). Certainly any adjustment in the American Law Institute
figures due to the adoption of the latter system in the federal courts
should be in the direction of a reduction in the number of jury trials:
the formula has been changed from inertia = jury trial, to inertia = no
jury trial.11
Thus, it may be concluded that the American Law Institute figures
as to the extent of jury trial in the disposition of cases represent the
maximum which can be expected under the present system:
Numbers of Cases of Various Types in Which the Different Modes of
TerminationWere Used1 2
(Each number under "All Cases" represents 1oo%)
Other
Percentage All
Dispositions
Jury "
Courte
of Cases Cases '
No. %
No.
9
Filed
ioo10 No. %
27o6 68.8
322 8.2
889 22.7
3919
10o.
All Law Actions
61I 70.5
125 14.3
867
129 14.8
22.1
Contract
2.2
io98 85.4
29
1286
148 11.5
32.9
Negligence
77 77.
4
4.
100
29 29.
2.6
Other Torts
268 41.2
380 58.4
65o
3
-4
16.6
Liquor Laws
32 21.2
119 78.8
15,
3.9
Immigration Laws
22.7
I6 72.9
5
20
I 4.5
.5
Bankruptcy Laws
76 76.8
22 22.3
99
I 1.
2.6
Income Tax Laws
155 91.7
.6
13
7.7
169
I
Other Federal Tax Laws 4.
Patents, Copyrights and
17 89.5
I
5.3
I
5.3
-5
19
Trade-mark Laws
178 84.2
29 13.8
210
4 1.9
Interstate Commerce Laws 5.3
74.3
40 38.9
I6
x56
Pure Food and Drug Laws 3.9
Penalties for Violation of
5 55.5
4 444
.J
6
Other Laws
Actions by or Against
5.
110 93.2
2 1.7
6
3.
118
State
23 37.1
36 58.
68
3 4.8
1.7
Miscellaneous
1085 58.5
770 41.5
2
.1
Io.
1857
All Admiralty Actions
3o61 75.
iox6 24.8
4076
100.
All Equity Suits
9. Id. at 2o.
10. 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5624.
ii. The Connecticut figures are also helpful in connection with the situation as it
exists in the District Court for the District of Columbia, invested as it is-unlike other
federal courts-with general jurisdiction.
12. Adapted, with the permission of the publishers, from charts in AmERICAN LAW
INSTItUTE, note 8 supra, at 59 and 76. The detailed breakdown under "All Admiralty
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Of course there were no juries in the equity suits and but few in
admiralty. But even on the law side only 8.2%o of the cases filed were
tried to a jury-322 cases out of close to 4,000. Of these 322, 5570'more than half-were cases involving negligence or other torts (no
one would suggest that such actions are calculated to create a jury-trial
problem 17). Even assuming that under the new Rules jury-trial
problems may arise in all other types of law actions, then according to
these figures the ratio of actions not relating to negligence, etc., and
tried by a jury to all law actions was but 3.7%. In relation to all of
the actions brought in the federal courts, but approximately 1.57 of
the cases are at all likely to present a jury-trial problem. And we will
see, as the analysis unfolds, that under the united administration only
a small number of this 1.5 0 will present the problem in any acute form.
The Connecticut figures likewise show a small proportion of jury
cases. In one study it was found that, out of 8,745 cases under examination, only 273 had juries-approximately 3.0o.1

s

Again, a large

number of these were negligence and similar tort actions-rarely presenting jury-trial problems. Eliminating these, at most I07% of the
cases might present difficulty. In a later study it was found that, out
of 12,839 cases under examination, 982 cases-7.6%o-were tried by
a jury; 19 but eliminating negligence and similar tort claims, no more
than i.6% of the cases could present a jury-trial problem.
These figures indicate that the number of cases which may possibly
be affected by "mergeritis" is slight indeed.
Focusing our attention upon this small group of cases and prescinding for the moment from any effect pleading merger may have
upon the determination of the right to jury trial, let us consider some
important factors which contribute to the confusion in this field. In
other words, having put the entire matter of jury trial in perspective
quantitatively, let us do so qualitatively.
Actions" and "All Equity Suits" has been omitted; columns in the original entitled
"Reference" "Defaults, etc." and "Dismissals, etc." have been here consolidated under
the heading "Other Dispositions".
13. "There are some very slight discrepancies between the figures in the first colunn and the totals of the other five columns. The discrepancies probably appeared in
the mechanical processes employed in compilation." Id. at 76, n. 3.
x4. Includes directed verdict.
15. Includes non-jury cases, cases where jury was waived, formal or otherwise,
and summary judgments.
i6. Includes default, consent, stipulation, compromise, dismissal, discontinuance,
withdrawal, non-suit, and remand to state court.
17. See note 6 supra.

i8.CLARI AND SHULMAN, oP.cit. supra note 8, at
i9.Id. at 28, Table X.

209,

Table A.
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The most obvious-and most fundamental-factor is the existence
side by side in Anglo-American jurisprudence of separate substantive
systems of law and equity. Though such a development has seemed
inevitable in legal history, nevertheless it is not designed to clarify our
immediate problem. This is particularly so since in many respects the
two systems cover the same subject-matter, often providing different
remedies for the same right and sometimes providing the same remedy.
Due to the origins of the two systems, jury trial was provided in one
and non-jury trial in the other. To whatever extent historically this
difference of treatment was influenced by practical matters of procedural expediency, such matters can no longer enter into the picture
now that the dichotomy has been crystallized in the Federal Constitution
and the constitutions of the various states. In fact, a plaintiff, before
the introduction of code pleading, was faced with the necessity of determining the nature of his action, not merely with reference to the jury
trial, but with reference to the forum in which he must enforce his
rights; and consequences hinged upon that decision which were much
greater than the mere possibility of losing a jury, e. g., if the running
of the statute prevented pleading over. Further, the existence of the
two systems often thwarted a litigant's effort to secure several types of
relief in the same suit or to raise certain types of defenses. From the
point of vsiew of efficient administration, the resulting multiplicity of
actions was admittedly undesirable.
A second factor which, entirely apart from pleading merger, contributes to the difficulty of the jury-trial problem is the growth of new
types of statutory actions enforceable in the federal courts. These include suits for patent and trade-mark infringement, declaratory judgment, 20 and public and private suits for violation of federal regulatory
measures, such as the Securities Act, the Anti-Trust Laws, Fair Trade
Acts, and labor relations legislation. In order to determine the right to
jury trial, it apparently becomes necessary for constitutional reasons
to assimilate these new types of actions to traditional vehicles for relief
in law or equity.
A third factor which has recently asserted itself for the first time
and may well be the source of future confusion is the effect, on the jurytrial problem, of the revolution in federal jurisprudence brought about
by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.211 Certainly the minimum right to a trial
20. For a recent discussion of the jury-trial problem in declaratory judgment
actions, see (1939) 13 So. CAIm'. L. REv. 17O. See also p. 666 infra.
21. 304 U. S. 64 (938).
See generally McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of
"General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILu. L. REV. 126; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
19,39) 34 Iu. L.
, RE:v. 271. See also Pike and Fischer, What Law Governs Matters
of "Substance" in Federal Practice (i94o) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 1.3.
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by jury in the federal courts is based upon the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. Thus, if a federal court should
decide in a given case that under the Seventh Amendment certain
daims or issues should be tried by jury, this mode of trial is proper even
though state decisions do not regard a jury as appropriate under the
circumstances. 22 Suppose, however, that the federal judge's independent judgment convinces him that the Seventh Amendment does not
require a jury trial, but the state law-statute or decision-holds that a
jury trial is appropriate. Recently one decision has held that in this
situation the federal court need not afford a jury trial; 23 another decision has held that it should. 4 If the right to jury trial upon demand is
a matter of procedure,2 5 the first decision is correct; but if it be regarded as a matter of substance,2 6 the second is correct. If the latter
position should prevail, while any federal decision requiring a jury trial
in a given situation would still be of value as precedent in determining
the minimum right afforded by the Seventh Amendment, a federal decision denying a jury trial would be of no value as precedent where the
state law is contrary. There is in this factor the potentiality of a most
confusing problem and one which, like the other two factors mentioned
above, is unaffected by whether there is pleading merger.
Thus, in the cases presenting the jury-trial problem the fever of the
patient can be traced to a number of causes other than "mergeritis".
2. Scott v. First Nat. Bank of Morris, 285 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; Tannille
v. Copeland, 288 Fed. 86o (N. D. Tex. 1923).
:3. Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore. 1939).
judge McColloch felt that the Seventh Amendment as construed by the federal courts
was the exclusive criterion, and doubted that the matter of jury trial was one of substantive law.
24. Beagle v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 38a.g, Case i (W. D.
Wash. 1940). Judge Bowen said: "The recent case of Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., [note 23 supra]. . . . relied upon by defendant may be distinguishable
on the ground that the court was there merely applying the established rule of the
Oregon District Court. But whether distinguishable or not, I do not think the rule of
that case should be applied in this one removed here from our state court where the
rule is clearly against the Hollingsworth case, especially in view of what I believe to
be the common practice in recent years of following in the federal court here the state
court practice of submitting the issue of fraudulent release to the jury.
"Furthermore, this is a typical situation where the rule of the late case of Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U. S. 64, should be applied and effect given to the law as announced by the state supreme court in order to avoid needless conflict between the federal and state courts as to what the law is in a given case, when that law is not declared
by an act of Congress, the constitution of the United States or the decision of a federal
appellate court binding on this court. My attention has not been called to any statutory
or constitutional provision giving defendant the specific right to have this fraudulent
release issue tried by the court without a jury. .... "
25. Cf. Franklin v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. S. M. Ry., 179 Minn. 480, 229 N.
W. 797 (1930); Singer v. Messina, 312 Pa. x29, 167 At. 583 (1933). See 3 BE
,
CONFLcr OF LAWS (935)

§ 594.r.

26. Cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Spencer, 2o F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927),
(1928) 12 MiNN. L. REV. 291; Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R., 224 Mo. App.
6oI, 31 S. W. (2d) 250 (1930).
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II. THE PROBLEM
Before discussing the effect of the pleadings upon the determination of the mode of trial, we must give some consideration to the extent
of the constitutional right of jury trial under the united administration
of law and equity. As to this matter there is not entire agreement.
Under one approach the entire controvery between the parties in
a given case is broken up into its "basic issues", and then the nature of
each (i. e., whether "legal" or "equitable") determines whether a jury
trial is to be afforded on such issue. According to Dean Clark,
". .. the constitutional question, where unaffected by statutes, is
the simple inquiry, was the issue now to be decided one which an
equity court would have decided without a jury at the time of the
adoption of the state constitutioi or would it have been passed
upon only by a jury in a court of law? 27 . . .When the question
of form of trial is raised by motion preliminary to the trial, it must
then be decided, and it can be decided by determining how the
issues presented by the pleadings would have been tried under the
former practice." 28
In connection with a situation presently to be discussed for illustrative purposes,2 9 Professor Moore says:
".. . where there is a claim and a counterclaim which is related
thereto, and one is equitable and the other legal in character, the
court should determine what are the basic issues, in ruling on the
right to jury. Thus in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, if
the defendant denies performance of the contract by the plaintiff
and counterclaims for damages for non-performance, either party
should, on demand, obtain a jury trial on the basic issues of performance and damages, with the court settling any remaining
issues." 30

On the other hand, Professor McCaskill insists upon the impossibility of determining the nature of "basic issues" as such, i. e., out of
their historical setting:
"The right of jury trial under the Seventh Amendment attached
to issues found in law actions only, never to issues in an equity
suit, and it is not true that the issues in a law action were never
the same as in an equity suit. On the contrary, almost any issue
27. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (928)

53.

28. Id. at 54. See also Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II.
Pleadingsand Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1296; James, Trial by Jury and The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. io22.
29. See pp. 652-654.

30. 3 MooRE AND FamIEDMr, MooRE's FimA PRAcrncE (1938) 3016.
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found in a law action may also be found in an equity suit. Issues
bearing upon a title to land may be found in an action of ejectment, but they are also found in bills quia timet, in injunction suits,
and many other strictly equitable proceedings. At one time if an
issue of title arose in an equity suit, a feigned issue was made up
and sent to a law court to try and report back to the equity court,
but even then the finding of the law court upon the issues was advisory only. In modem times equity courts try these issues themselves, calling in juries to aid them or not as they see fit. Issues
of possession, of money due on promises, of damages to property,
even of negligence resulting in personal injury, are found in equity
suits as well as in law actions. Issues are colorless apart from the
proceedings in which they are found. Their character, as triable
with or without jury, depends upon association with other issues
and remedies sought upon their determination." 31
The application of these criteria can perhaps be better understood
by an analysis of a case which has often been used as a focal point in
discussions in this field: Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co. 8 2 The plaintiff brought an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien and combined with
the prayer for equitable relief an alternative claim for money judgment. The complaint alleged that the defendant undertook to make
advances to the plaintiff during the progress of the work contracted
for; but that after a time defendant refused to do so and discharged
the plaintiff. The answer denied the material allegations of the complaint and set up a counterclaim in which a money judgment was demanded for the plaintiff's alleged abandonment of the contract. After
replying, the plaintiff moved that issues be stated for trial by jury.
Ultimately, two issues were so stated: (I) Was the plaintiff entitled to
a money judgment, and how much? (2) Was the defendant contractor
entitled to a money judgment, and how much? A special verdict was
rendered by which it was found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover over $4,ooo, and the defendant was entitled to recover nothing.
On the trial of the remaining issues in the case the plaintiff took the
position that the jury verdict was conclusive; the defendant, that it was
merely advisory. The existence of the lien being disproved, the court
refused equitable relief but granted the plaintiff a money judgment,
finding the jury verdict conclusive. The Court of Appeals, by Judge
Cardozo, decided that the verdict was merely advisory as to the plaintiff's case, but conclusive as to the counterclaim.
The status of the claims and issues is here indicated:
31. McCasldll, note 2 supra, at 318-319.
32. 22o N. Y. 391, H5 N. E. 993 (1917).
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Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co.
CLAIM

COUNTERCLAIM

To foreclose

For money

For money

mechanic's
lien
(Equitable)

judgment
(Legal)

judgment
(Legal)

Existence

of contract (not in

issue)

Performance or breach of terms of contract
Value of:

Extent of
damages for
abandonment

Existence of
lien
Before the Code plaintiff's claim could have been classified in
either of two ways: (I) A suit in equity to foreclose a mechanic's lien
plus an action at law for money judgment, or (2) a suit in equity to
foreclose a mechanic's lien, with damages as incidental relief (an "equity
merger"). The option lay with the plaintiff. If the first course was
followed, there would have been two suits. The suit to foreclose the
mechanic's lien would have been tried to the court, and the action for
money judgment tried to the jury. If the plaintiff chose the second
alternative, the entire controversy normally would have been tried to
the court, neither party having a right to jury trial, and there would
have then been one suit.
Under Professor McCaskill's analysis, the plaintiff should still
have the option of procuring an equity merger or of having separate
causes tried according to the modes in equity and law, respectively. The
dotted line on the chart separates the two aspects of the plaintiff's claim
under this analysis; the third column represents the defendant's counterclaim. Separated by the horizontal lines are the elements of the
claims. It will be seen that the existence of the contract is common
to both aspects of the plaintiff's claim and to the counterclaim; but in
the particular case this question was not left in issue by the pleadings.
Likewise the controversy with respect to the performance or breach
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of the terms of the contract by the respective parties is common to both
aspects of the plaintiff's claim and to the counterclaim, and is in issue
in all respects. The value of the labor and materials is in issue but is
relevant only to the plaintiff's case; the issue as to the existence of damages resulting from the plaintiff's alleged abandonment of the job is
relevant only to the counterclaim. Finally, the existence of the lien is
relevant only to the equitable aspect of the plaintiff's claim.
Professor Moore's statement with respect to this case 33 indicates
that under the "basic issue" test the common issue of performance or
breach of terms of the contract would be tried by jury upon the demand
of either party, even insofar as the issue relates to the equitable aspect
of the plaintiff's case. Both the issue on the value of labor and materials and the extent of damages for abandonment (relating to the claim
and counterclaim, respectively) would be tried to the jury; and the
remaining issue, the existence of the lien (relating only to the equitable
aspect'of the plaintiff's claim) would be tried to the court. Professor
McCaskill insists the alternative prayer for damages indicated what he
believes should still be plaintiff's option to have his legal and equitable
claims kept separate for the purpose of determining the right to jury
trial. 34 Further, upon the demand of either party the counterclaim
would be tried to the jury.
The Di Menna case illustrates the types of situations in which the
jury-trial problem arises. With respect to such situations let us consider the effect of the pleadings on the determination of the right to
jury trial.
III. THE PROBLEM AND PLEADING
It is not the purpose of this article to take a position as to the extent
of the right to jury trial under a system providing for the one form of
action; our position is that it does not follow from either analysis referred to above that pleading should be constricted into historical forms
which had their development in the administration of legal and equitable
claims in separate courts. But since Professor McCaskill's criticism
of the "merger" theory is put in terms of his own analysis of the extent
of the constitutional right, the following discussion of the effect of
pleadings upon the determination of that right will be based upon an
analysis similar to his. Our support for the "merger" point of view
is based, first, upon the fact that cases involving jury-trial problems constitute an extremely small percentage of the actions in which pleadings
will be filed, and that therefore, any difficulty attendant to these few
cases does not justify what is for cases at large an undesirable form of
33. See p. 65, supra.
34. But see pp. 656-657 infra.
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pleading.35 But our position is also based upon the fact that even in
this relatively small number of cases the retention of the historical
forms of pleading will be of little or no help in solving the jury-trial
problem.
We have already adverted to some of the factors which, entirely
apart from pleading, play their part in complicating the picture. Let us
consider what effect the requirement of traditional forms of pleading
would have upon the solution of the more difficult situations.
A. Where formerly a party had to bring two separate actions in
order to secure complete relief. One situation arises where there are
involved types of claims as to which chancellors did not grant damages
as incidental relief, or otherwise did not grant complete relief in the
same suit. Formerly, a party would have brought a suit in equity and
an action at law,3 6 with a court trial as to the first and a jury trial as
to the second (unless he and the defendant stipulated the jury away).
The plaintiff never had an option as to the mode of the trial with respect
to his two claims. Thus no procedural step he can take under the new
Rules can be construed as the exercise of an option binding on the
parties. True, if he fails to demand a jury trial on his legal claim he
waives his right to a jury, but the defendant's right is still preserved.
In general, this situation should not be affected by the form the pleadings take; regardless of the categorizations and labels in the pleadings,
the historical modes of trial must be looked to primarily; the plaintiff
having no option anyway, his pleadings are indicative of no choice
controlling in the case.
A second situation involves a duplication of trials, but again these
difficulties are neither decreased nor increased by the use of any particular system of pleading. This situation is presented where a plaintiff seeks equitable relief and legal relief (on the theory that the legal
relief is incidental-"equity merger") and the equities fail.3 7 It can be
assumed that damages alone cannot be given without affording the
parties a right to a jury trial (and adequate notice of the existence of
that right). If the defendant is content to let the action proceed as an
action for damages without his jury trial, it may be the plaintiff is in
no position to complain; but if at this juncture the defendant insists
upon his jury trial, a new trial will have to be ordered.
35. See pp. 662-665 infra.
36. E. g., the facts in Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F. (2d)
426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 594 (1928) (to secure an injunction
and triple damages under Anti-Trust laws, separate suits in law and equity are necessary). See also pp. 667-668 infra.
37. E. g., the facts in Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 22o N. Y. 391, 115 N. E.
993 (I917) analyzed at pp. 652-654 supra.
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As unfortunate as this result may be, it is somewhat less troublesome than the result which would have occurred before; the action
would have been dismissed, and, if the statute had not run, the plaintiff
would begin over again at law. Both before and under the Rules the
necessity for a new trial does not arise from confusion in the pleadings
or anything concerned therewith; rather it arises from a failure of
proof. This is especially apparent in a variant of the situation under
discussion: plaintiff asks for equitable relief only and at the trial, although his equities fall, he establishes his right to damages. 38 Here
again, if the defendant insists, a new trial must be ordered. Formerly,
at best, a new action would have to be instituted; at worst, the plaintiff
would have lost his right of action by the running of the statute.
B. Where a party had the option of enforcing his rights separately at law and in equity or in one equity suit. Under one set of circumstances, a party could secure an injunction in equity and damages
at law, or, by taking advantage of an "equity merger", could secure
both in the equity court. Here pra!ctically speaking, the defendant had
no right to a jury trial; he had only a chance of securing one-a chance
which depended upon whether the plaintiff desired to take advantage
of the procedural convenience of an "equity merger" or whether he was
sufficiently desirous of having his damages fixed by a jury as to be willing to bring separate actions.39 Now with the combined administration this situation need not be altered one whit-even as to the procedural method of articulating the plaintiff's option. He may bring
two actions or one. If he brings two, and demands a jury on the action
for damages he will get it; if he brings one, he should not get it; nor
should the defendant.
This result is not based on what Professor McCaskill refers to as
a "new waiver" unauthorized by constitution, statute, or rule. Rather
the result is the same as that which occurred when the plaintiff effected a
traditional "equity merger". True, just as before, to secure a jury
trial on the claim for damages, plaintiff will have to bring separate
suits. But since Professor McCaskill expresses as much fear of extending the right to jury trial as of curtailing it,40 he certainly should not

want the new Rules construed in such a way as to afford a jury trial
where it was not heretofore available. If the court should allow a jury
38. E. g., see the facts in Jackson v. Strong,
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N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917),

where a switch in theory was not allowed. (But in most code states a plaintiff could
probably amend to meet the situation; under the new Rules he need not even do that
if the evidence of damages is received without objection. See Rule 15 (b) ; Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 47 YALE
L. J. 5o, 66-67.)

39. E. g., the facts in Bidwell v. Astor Mutual Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 263, 276 (1857);
Back v. Peoples Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 At. 6o3 (1922).
40. McCaskill, note 2 supra, at 316-317.
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trial to a plaintiff who chooses to bring but one action in the situation
under discussion, it is in effect holding that under the new Federal
Rules a party may have all of the procedural advantages formerly allowed in an equity merger and at the same time secure the form of
trial he formerly would have obtained only by the more inconvenient
method of separate actions. Yet it is surprising to find that exactly
this result will follow under the rules of practice recently adopted to
supplement the Illinois Civil Practice Act 41 and endorsed by Professor
McCaskill. 42 It is difficult to reconcile these Rules with his desire not
to extend the right to jury trial any more than to narrow it. The view
that under the new Federal Rules a jury will be had on the claim for
damages if two actions are brought and not if one is brought, does meet
this ideal. The same right to jury trial is present, with the same mode
of expressing the election; jury trial is neither encouraged nor discouraged more than formerly. On the other hand, extension of jury
trials-without historical justification-will result from the Illinois
Rules, though they constitute a labored attempt to preserve in the pleadings a semblance of the law-equity dichotomy.
Nor should the right to jury trial be extended in the related situation where by statute or rule a defendant is permitted to plead a legal
counterclaim to an equitable claim, as under Rule 13 (b) .4 The defendant has the option of bringing a separate action on his claim (in
which case he may have a jury if he demands it) or of "merging" his
41. ILL. PRAc. RULES (1935) Rule 1o: "Issues Cognizable by Court of Equity.
All matters which, prior to January 1, 1934, were within the jurisdiction of a court of
equity, whether directly or as an incident to other matters before it, or which the equity
court could have heard so as to do complete justice between the parties, may hereafter
be regarded as a single equitable cause of action, and when so treated as a single cause
of action shall be pleaded without being set forth in separate counts and without the use
of the term 'count' in such pleading; and shall be heard and decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of equity."
Rule ii: "Pleading of Equitable Matters. When actions in law and in chancery
which may be prosecuted separately are joined, the party joining such actions may, if
he desires to treat them as separate causes of action, plead such causes of action in
distinct counts, marked respectively 'separate action at law' and 'separate action in
chancery.' When so pleaded the court shall first determine whether the actions joined
by the separate counts are properly severable, and, if so, whether the actions shall be
tried separately and in what order, or whether the actions shall be tried together. If
the court determines that the actions are severable, the issues formed on the legal
counts shall be tried before a jury when a jury has been properly demanded, or by the
court when a jury has not been properly demanded, and the equitable issues shall be
heard and decided in the manner heretofore practiced in courts of equity. _
"The provisions of this rule as to pleadings, practice, and trial by jury when seasonably demanded, shall apply to answers, counter-claims and any other pleadings
wherever legal and equitable matters are permitted to be joined under the Civil Practice Act.
"If the facts are adequately stated in one part of a pleading, or in any one pleading,
they need not be repeated elsewhere in such pleading, or in other pleadings and may be
incorporated elsewhere or in other pleadings by reference."
42. McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, for the Federal
Courts (1935) 30 ILL. L. REV. 415, 442-445.
43. The problem as it arises in connection with compulsory counterclaims is to be
discussed presently. See pp. 658-659 infra.
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claim (in which case he will not have a jury 4 4). Here nothing is
denied the defendant by this "new merger"; he need not "merge" if he
does not want to. 5 But since to deny the plaintiff his right to jury trial
in this situation would be to deny him a right of which he could in no
way have been deprived prior to the Codes, he still retains 4the right to
have a jury trial on the legal counterclaim if he demands it. 6
It is important to note in this last case that the form of the pleadings can have no bearing on the jury-trial question; it never had
before-one action or two was the test; and it still is.
C. Where the party has no option but must enforce all his rights
in a particularaction. This situation results because of the development of other principles of procedure than the ones here under consideration. One instance is where rules of res Judicata are applied in a
way to reach the same result as in Hahl v. Sugo.4 7 There, desiring to
rid himself of an encroachment on his property, plaintiff sued for
ejectment, and won; but finding the sheriff unwilling to assume the
burden of destroying the outer wall of defendant's building, he brought
another action to secure a mandatory injunction compelling the defendant to perform this task. The court held that res judicata barred the
second action. Whether one likes this result or not, how does it affect
the problem of jury trial? Although the doctrine of Hahl v. Sugo requires a plaintiff to bring in one action what may have been formerly
severable legal and equitable claims, his doing so cannot be construed
as indicating an intent to forego a jury trial on a legal claim. This is
to be contrasted with the situations where the party voluntarily chooses
a "merger".

48

The final problem is created by Rule 13 (a), providing that a party
must raise by counterclaim any claim which he has against the opposing
party "if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 4" Here the defendant by
"merging" a legal claim into an otherwise equitable action cannot, in
44. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 26o U. S. 360 (1922); Horwitz
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 8o F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
45. In this connection see the recent case of S. Klein, Inc. v. New Deal Bldg.
Corp., I4 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (Sup. Ct. z939).
46. See National Elec. Products Corp. v. Circle Flexible Conduit Co,, Inc., 57 F.
(2d) 219 (E. D. N. Y. I931); Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans, 22o N. Y. 391, II5 N. E.
993 (1917), discussed at pp. 652-654 mtpra.
47. 169 N. Y. IO9, 62 N. E. 135 (1901).
457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923).

Cf. City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y.

48. See discussion under B., p. 656 mtpra.
49. FE. RuLEs Civ. PRoc. (1938) Rule 13 (a) : "Compulsory Counterclaims. A
pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim, not the subject of a pending action,
which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if
it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction."
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doing what he was required to do, be held to have waived his right to
a jury. Nor can the plaintiff by this "new merger" be denied a jury
trial if he desires it.
In brief, where a party has a choice, his bringing of one or two
actions, respectively, is sufficient articulation of such choice. But where
a party has no choice it is the historical nature of the claims that governs, not the wishful draftsmanship of the parties.
However, it may be asked, does not the form of pleadings help
in this historical determination? Professor McCaskill insists that
without pleading to light the way, the jury demands of the parties will
be "arrows shot in the dark". 50 In any case as difficult as the ones under
discussion, the light shed by any one of the parties in his pleading will
indeed be feeble. More to the point than the self-serving classifications
in such pleadings is the briefing of the point and the argument thereon
-if and when the question should arise. In any event the labels and
classifications of the parties do not govern as to the nature of the claim,
except insofar as they reflect a choice by the plaintiff. But, as has already been said, where the plaintiff has a choice he displays it just as
he did before-by bringing two actions or one. 51 As to the historical
nature of the claim or claims, defenses or counterclaims, the material
gathered and presented at the argument of the question will be much
more helpful to the court in gaining a true grasp of the matter than the
view adopted by the parties at a time when a controversy over the jurytrial problem may or may not have been envisioned. 5 2
"Equitable defenses". Mention should be made of the confusion
as to the jury-trial problem where "equitable defenses" are involved.5 3
Much of the conflict in this field comes from a loose use of the
phrase "equitable defenses". This phrase has been used to mean three
distinct things: (i) defenses to equitable claims; (2) an equitable
right cognizable as a defense at law even before the one form of action;
and (3) rights formerly enforceable only by an independent suit in
equity. Taken in its first meaning, it is obviously triable to the court.
Taken in its second meaning, the so-called "equitable defense" has
5o. McCaskill, note 2 supra, at 329.
51. See pp. 656-658 supra.
52. Professor McCaskill says (note 2 supra, at 329) : "The wishes of the parties,
or the guesses of the trial judges, rather than the Constitution, will determine what is
obtained." In which case will the decision of a judge be more of a guess; after an examination of the pleadings or after adequate argument and briefing of the question? As
to the wishes of the parties, one of Professor McCaskill's main theses is that in the
class of cases represented by the first situation under B., p. 656 in!ra, the wishes of one
of the parties should be determinative of thq constitutional right. McCaskill, note 2
supra, passlin.
53. See generally Cook, Equitable Defenses (923) 32 YALE L. J. 645; Hinton,
Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes (1920) 18 MICH. L. REV. 717.
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54
really come to be a legal defense and as such is triable to the jury.
And in the third meaning, it is really an "equitable counterclaim"-an
independent claim which may be asserted in the same action in order
to dispose of the entire controversy between the parties. 55 Assuming
that, judged historically, the "equitable defense" is of this type, it is
easy to reach the conclusion that a non-jury trial is appropriate.
Under the united administration the primary problem is to determine of which type is a given "equitable defense". In these situations,
the defendant has no option to secure a jury trial or not, as does the
plaintiff in a situation where an equity merger is available. In other
words, the nature of the defense is to be determined only historically,
not by defendant's desire in the matter. Thus the nature of the facts
asserted rather than the form in which the defendant casts his "equitable
defense" is the determinative factor. Here again, it is difficult to see
how the form of the pleadings is going to help or hinder in the solution
of the problem. In the first place, in the nature of things such defenses are separately stated from the claim (and Professor McCaskill
seems to think that separate statement is the solution with respect to
unscrambling the legal and equitable aspects of the plaintiff's case).
Second, insofar as the distinction between equitable and legal defenses
is concerned, the self-serving classification of the defendant will not
govern. Third, insofar as the distinction between equitable and legal
aspects of a particular counterclaim is concerned, the discussion above
56
as to the claim is apposite.
With this analysis in mind, let us examine Professor McCaskill's

suggested construction of Rule IO (b)."

Assuming that there is an

intimate connection between pleading and the determination of the right
to jury trial, he urges that this Rule should be construed to require that
each claim and defense-legal or equitable-be separately stated. 58
We feel that we have sufficiently shown that, whatever their form, the
pleadings have little or no effect on jury-trial determination. We feel
that in any event it has too little an effect to warrant scrapping the advantages which flow from "lay transaction" pleading-advantages
recognized to accrue to ioo% of the cases not merely to the i or 2%
which may involve jury trial problems. 59 However, Professor McCaskill's construction is not only undesirable; in addition, the language of
Rule IO (b) will not suffer it. The last sentence of the Rule reads:
54. Compare Radio Corporation of America v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U. S. 459

(I935), and King v. International Lumber Co., 156 Minn. 494, 195 N. W. 450

55. E. g., see the facts in Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co.,
285, 146 N. E. 381 (1925).
56. See pp. 655-659 supra.
57. See note i supra.
58. McCaskill, note 2 supra, at 326 et seq.
59. See pp. 662-665 infra.

(1923).
239 N.

Y.
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"Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence
and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate
count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth."
Professor McCaskill would make "transaction" co-terminous with
"claim" and "claim" co-terminous with what would have been included
in one count in an action in one court. Thus, if, as in the Di Menna
case, the plaintiff should desire to take advantage of an equity merger,
he would state in one count the facts which give rise to the right of
enforcement of lien and to a money judgment. But if the plaintiff
should choose to have a jury trial on the legal aspect of his case, he
would state the legal and equitable aspects of the same facts in two
counts. This result is reached in Illinois by a very detailed statement
in the Civil Practice Rules. 60 But Rule io (b) is not so worded. If
"claim" is to be co-terminous with "transaction or occurrence", why
the phrase "each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence"? Why not just "each claim"?
Further, let us consider the effect on these Rules, of limiting
"transaction or occurrence" to "claim": 13 (a), 13 (g),
20 (a).

15

(c), and

Rule 13 (a) provides that a pleading "shall state as a counterclaim
any claim, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim..
Professor McCaskill's construction ("transaction"="claim") would
limit the compulsory counterclaim to virtually one situation: a counterclaim for declaratory relief on the same facts as the claim; but whether
this type of counterclaim is even permissible under the new Rules is
61
left in doubt by the decisions.

Rule 13 (g) provides that "a pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim which one party has against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action
or of a counterclaim therein." Professor McCaskill's construction of
"transaction" completely excludes the possibility of a cross-claim, be6o. See ILL. PRAc. RULES (1935) Rules io and ii, quoted in note 40 supra.
6I. Counterclaim disallowed: Stanley Works v. C. S. Mersick & Co., i Fed. Rules
Serv. 13.4, Case 2 (D. Conn. 1939) ; Cheney Co. v. Cunningham, 29 F. Supp. 847 (W.

D. Pa. 1939) ; see also concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., in Leach v. Ross Heater &
Mfg. Co., 104 F. (2d) 88, 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
Counterclaim allowed: Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 27 F. Supp. i6o (S. D.

N. Y. 1939); Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
1021 CE. D. N. Y. 1939).
See Pike and Fischer, Counterclaimfor DeclaratoryRelief on Matters Already in

Issue (1940) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 13.4.
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cause a second claim could not exist in any one's favor arising out of
62
the same transaction. If it is another claim, it is another transaction.
Also, Rule 15 (c) clearly contemplates a "transaction" which is
broader than "claim" by providing that "whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." While
in fact one decision has limited "transaction" in this Rule to "claim", 63
it clearly violates the meaning of the Rule and the very object for which
it was inserted. 64 Fortunately other decisions have more carefully
regarded the language of the Rule. 65
Finally, Professor McCaskill's identification of "claim" with
"transaction" would tend unduly to narrow joinder of parties under
Rule.2o (a), the scope of which (assuming a common question of law
or fact) is "the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions
or occurrences".
It should seem clear then that "claim" and "transaction" in Rule
IO (b) cannot be made co-terminous. Even the most admirable concern over historic jury rights does not warrant complete disregard of
the clear meaning of Rules io (b), 13 (a), 13 (g), 15 (c), and 20 (a).
Furthermore, a forced construction of Rule IO (b) is not the means of
solving the admitted problem of the determination of the right to jury
trial in the few difficult cases. The new Rules provide other machinery
which can be utilized with much greater effectiveness for that purpose.
The Rules are the expression of a sound philosophy of procedure. 6
Trial-preparation steps under any system of procedure are designed
to serve one or more of three functions: (i) issue-formulation, (2)
fact-revelation, and (3) notice-giving. Under the common law system
and, to a great extent, under the codes, the burden of performing all
these tasks rests on pleading alone. Yet it is a matter of common experience that pleading is a very feeble instrument for the performance
of the first two of these functions; exchange of written correspondence
is a poor means of narrowing a dispute or of procuring facts from an
adversary. And any issue-formulation that may be accomplished by
62. To much the same effect, see dissenting opinion of Vinje, C. J., in Liebbauser
v..Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., i8o Wis. 468, 193 N. W. 522 (1923).
63. L. E. Whitham Const. Co. v. Remer, 105 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. ioth, 1939).
64. See Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 5o, 68-69; Pike and Fischer, Relation Back of Amendments to Pleadings after Statute of Limitations Has Run (1939) 2 Fed. Rules Serv.
15c.I.

65. E. g., Independence Shares v. Deckert, io8 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
White v. Holland Furnace Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. I5c.I, Case 5 (S. D. Ohio x939).
66. See generally PIKE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 57-60; Simpson, The Pleading
Problem (939) 53 HARV. L. REv. 169.
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the pleadings is now relatively ineffectual because of the liberal rules
on variance and amendment of pleadings during the course of trial.
Insofar as fact-gathering is concerned, much more effective methods are found in the liberal discovery procedure. 67 After the parties
are in possession of the facts and have had the advantage of the informal method of the pre-trial hearing, the real issues of the controversy may emerge. 68 At this point the parties and the court have a
much better opportunity to give intelligent consideration to the historic nature of the issues that remain, and to the appropriateness of
jury trial thereon, than is afforded by any of the preceding paper work.
Further, since, as we have seen, by far the greater percentage of the
cases originally filed will not go beyond the pre-trial stage and very
few of them involve any really close question, it would seem that as a
matter of judicial administration any consideration of the question of
jury trial should be deferred until this time. If the case is one of the
close ones, any party desiring a jury should of course protect himself
meanwhile by making a proper and timely demand.
Professor McCaskill regards the shift of emphasis to discovery
and pre-trial as the result of liberality in pleading, 9 without recognizing that liberality in pleading is made appropriate by the availability of these latter steps and that in fact these steps have been provided because of the inadequacy of even the best form of pleading
to assume all the burdens allotted to it. Now the only function left
for pleading to bear alone is that of notice-giving, a task for which
it is admirably devised.
Professor McCaskill assumes, however, that this philosophy of
procedure is only the dream of scholars and has not been applied by the
federal judges. He says of notice pleading, it is "much advocated but
nowhere used in courts of record in this country" and he avers that
he "has been unable to discover that any of the federal courts have
thus far fallen victims of 'mergeritis'." 70 Let us consider the decisions
under the new Rules to determine what view federal courts have taken
toward the whole matter.
First, as to notice pleading. The most apparent incidents of this
system of pleading are (i) the elimination of the supposed distinction
between "ultimate facts", "evidentiary matter" and "conclusions of
law", and (2) the abandonment of the "theory of the pleadings doc67. See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure

(1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1179, 1436; Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation
(1940) 7 U. OF CH .L. REV. 297.

L.

68. See Sunderland, Theory and Practiceof Pre-TrialProcedure (1937) 36 MICH.

REv. 215.

69. McCaskill, note 2 supra, at 325, n.
7o. Id. at 325, n. 26 and 329.

25.
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trine". As to the first matter, Professor McCaskill did not believe that
the ultimate fact distinction was abolished by leaving out of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act the phrase "material facts" or "ultimate facts". 71
And apparently some of the decisions have borne him out; 72 but it
should be noted that the phrase "cause of action" was left in the Illinois
statute. Rule 8 (a) provides that the plaintiff shall give "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief". Writers have assumed that this Rule has abolished the ultimate
fact trichotomy which has resulted in so much futile litigation. 73 Although it involved a revolution in judicial thinking, the new approach
has received support in the decisions.7 4 For example, in MacLeod v.
Cohen-Erichs Corp.,75 Judge Hulbert compared the wording of Equity
Rule 25 ("a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon
which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of evidence") with the language of the new Federal Rule and reached the
conclusion that the old distinctions no longer obtain. "Judged by these
standards, the complaint appears to be sufficiently definite to give fair
notice to the defendant . . ." 16
And in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Timetrust, Inc.,77 Judge St. Sure, ruling on motions
directed to the complaint, said: "The modern philosophy concerning
pleadings is that they do little more than indicate generally the type of
litigation that is involved. A generalized summary of the case that
affords fair notice is all that is required." 7s Further, from the decisions
to date it would appear that "the theory of the pleadings" doctrine 79
will find no place in the new practice.80
Likewise the courts have given the broadest scope to discovery
procedure, carrying out fully its purpose as the main machinery for
71. ILL. Civ. PRAc. Acr ANN. (1933) 64-67. Compare the view of the late Professor Hinton, quoted in Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Facts" (1937) 4 U. OF
CHI. L. REV. 233, 234-235.

72. E. g., Knaus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 365 Ill. 588, 7 N. E. (2d) 298

(1937) ; Carlton v. Smith, 285 IIl. App. 38o, 2 N. E. (2d) 116 (1936).
73. MOORE AND FRIEDMAN, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE (1938) § 8.07; Flory and
McMahon, The New Federal Rules and LouisianaPractice (1938) I LA. L. REV. 45, 50;

Gavit, The New FederalRules and State Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 367, 369-370;
Note (1938) 12 Wis. L. REV. 517, 521.
74. See generally Pike and Fischer, Status of the Ultimate Fact Test if Pleading
under the New Federal Rules (1939) I Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.24. In addition to the
cases discussed in the text, see Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, 28 F. Supp. 737 (M. D. Pa.
1939) ; but cf. Shultz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., i Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.25,
Case 3 (W. D. N. Y. 1939).
75. 28 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
76. Id. at 105.
77. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Cal. 1939).
78. Id. at 41.

79. I. e., that for the purposes of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, the admissibility of evidence, or the appropriateness of a remedy, a party is limited to the legal
theory displayed in his pleading.
8o. See, e. g., Gay v. E. H. Moore, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 749 (E. D. Okla. 1939)
(equitable relief [order setting aside administrative action] held proper on complaint
for damages); Nester v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 25 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal.
1938) (plaintiff awarded damages in contract on complaint based on tort).
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fact-revelation. 8 1 In fact, the decisions have so consistently seen the
advantage of this procedure over steps to polish up the pleadings that
the use of bills of particulars has been seriously curtailed, 2 and the
cases have left little factual basis for Professor McCaskill's prophecy
that "Common counts [authorized by official Forms 4-8] produce bills
of particulars".88 Also, increasing use is being made of the pre-trial
procedure under Rule 16.84
Although .this philosophy of procedure has been adopted, jury trial
problems seem to have caused little difficulty in the federal courts, and
even where close cases have been presented decisions have been reached
which are in line with the analysis presented above-an analysis which
affords to each party his traditional constitutional rights-no more, no
less.

IV.

THE PRAcTIcE

Since the effective date of the Rules there have been a number of
decisions which discuss the problem at hand.
In one case Judge McColloch properly ruled that a defense of
fraud should be tried to the court, even though the claim to which the
defense appertained was tried to the jury. 85 In the second, the plaintiff
in an action for breach of a royalty contract demanded, in addition to
damages, that he be given the right to inspect the defendant's plant;
and he claimed that the action was equitable for trial purposes because
it included this prayer for "discovery". Judge Gibson had no difficulty in holding that since the discovery of property was properly obtainable under Rule 34 the claim was essentially legal and should be
tried by the jury at the defendant's demand. 86 In a third, the plaintiff desired to recover damages for negligence against a drug store corporation which was dissolved before the institution of suit. Thus, in
addition to damages, the plaintiff prayed for an order setting aside the
dissolution. The court ruled that insofar as the claim sought this order
it should be tried as a non-jury action, and then if the plaintiff were
81. There have been over a hundred decision on the new discovery rules. Typical
of the liberality in construction are, Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla. 1939) ;
Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp. 498 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939) ; Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. goS
(D. Mass. 1938). See cases collected in Pike and Willis, note 66 supra, at 297.
82. Latest in a long line of decisions in point is United States v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 12e.231, Case IO (W.- D. N. Y. I94O). See also
Pearson v. Hershey Creamery Co., 3o F. Supp. 82 (M. D. Pa. 1939).
83. McCaskill, note 2 supra, at 325, n. 25.
84. In this connection see e. g., Dist. Col. Rule 2% (1939) (compulsory); S. D.
Cal. Rule 12 (1938) ; D. Idaho Rule 33 (1938) ; W. D. N. Y. Rule io (1938); S. D.
Rule 9 (1938); M. D. Pa. Rule 16 (1938); E. D. Ark. Rule 4 (r939); W. D. Ark.
Rule 4 (939).
Also see Justice Laws, Plan for Pre-Trial Procedure under New.
Rules in the Districtof Columbia (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 855.
85. Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore. 1939).
86. United States Process Corp. v. Fort Pitt Brewing Co., 29 F. Supp. 37 (W. D.
Pa. 1939).
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successful in that respect, the claim for damages should be tried by the
8
jury. 7
One of the cases, otherwise simple, was complicated by the fact that
the normal position of the parties was reversed through the use of declaratory judgment procedure.8 8 While Ted McDonald was taking Evelyn
Brune for a ride, his car went off the road and they were both injured.
Miss Brune sued Mr. McDonald for damages. Mr. McDonald's insurance company instituted the instant action for a declaration that it
was relieved from any liability on the policy since the defendants were
fraudulently conspiring to secure judgment against McDonald, and
since McDonald was not cooperating in his defense, particularly with
respect to a claim for contributory negligence which he did not assert.
The insurance company desired the action to be tried as in equity,
whereas the defendants demanded a jury. In ruling that a jury trial
was proper, Judge Wilbur said, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
"In the absence of the insurance policy and its agreement for cooperation the insured would have a perfect right to confess judgment in favor of the injured person regardless of whether or not
there was any legal liability for the injury. It follows from what
we have said that we simply have a situation herein where a party
who has issued a policy of insurance anticipates a suit thereon by
the insured or one subrogated to his rights and to avoid delay brings
the matter before the court by petition for declaratory relief. In
such a proceeding, although the parties are reversed in their position before the court, that is, the defendant has become the plaintiff, and vice versa, issues are ones which in the absence of the
statute for declaratory relief would be tried at law by a court and
jury. In such a case we hold that there is an absolute right to a
jury trial unless a jury has been waived." 89
In Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft.Novelty Co. 90 plaintiff alleged infringement of patent, seeking damages already sustained and injunctive
relief against future infringement. Plaintiff demanded a jury; defendant moved to strike the case from the jury calendar. By statute a plaintiff is given two remedies for the enforcement of his patent rights:
(i)

an action on tle case to recover damages; 91 and (2) a suit for

injunction "according to the course and principles of courts of equity" 92
-one of which principles is that damages for past conduct should be
87. Frissell v. Rateau Drug Store, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 816 (W. D. La. i939).
88. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 107 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
89. Id. at 448.
90. 30 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1939).
91. RFV. STAT.§ 4919 (I875), 35 U. S. C. A. § 67 (1929).
92. Rav. STAT. § 4921 (I875), 35 U. S. C. A. §70 (,929).
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afforded as incidental relief. Although based on statute this is a situation where the plaintiff, to secure both an injunction and damages, has
an option to bring separate actions at law and in equity or to take advantage of an "equity merger", securing an injunction and damages
on the equity side.9 3 The court held that the plaintiff, by seeking in
one action both an injunction and damages "elects to resort to the statute providing injunctive relief" and "has no right to a jury trial". 4
This is not because the court is promulgating what Professor McCaskill calls a "new waiver" not authorized by the Constitution or the
Rules; rather, the court is ruling just as it would have before and holds
that by electing to seek all his relief in one action the plaintiff effected
a traditional "equity merger". Certainly the Bellavance case is an admirable example of the restriction of the right to jury trial to just
exactly its constitutional limits-and this under a "lay transaction" system of pleading.
An interesting contrast to this decision is afforded by Columbia
River Packers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton.95 There the plaintiff charged the
defendant with violation of the Anti-Trust Laws. As in the case of
patent infringement, two statutory remedies have been available; but,
unlike patent infringement, it has been well settled that an "equity
merger" is not possible and injunction and damages for anti-trust
violation must be sought in separate actions 96 -in other words, the first
situation discussed above.9 7 Here plaintiff's seeking of both forms
of relief in one action could not possibly be construed as an election to
effect an "equity merger", since historically there was no equity merger possible under these circumstances. And apparently the court
resisted any temptation the form of the pleadings may have held out to
violate Professor McCaskill's injunction against "new mergers" resulting from mere joinder: if plaintiff had claimed both an injunction and
damages either party wculd have been entitled to a jury trial insofar
as the claim for damages was concerned.
However, it happened in this case that the complaint was not
explicit with respect to damages; therefore, when on the argument of
the cause plaintiff demanded damages (supporting proof therefor having been received without objection), the defendant insisted that he had
a right to a jury trial upon this claim. And the court agreed with him.
In reaching this result there was no departure from the traditional
situation, either as to the extent of the right to jury trial or as to the
93. See pp. 656-657 .upra.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 3o F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1939).
I Fed. Rules Serv. 38b.12, Case i (D. Ore. 1939).
See cases cited in note 36 supra.
See pp. 655-656 mtpra.
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degree of procedural efficiency. With respect to the latter, it took two
trials to adjudicate the plaintiff's rights, just as it would have before.
The same result would have been reached under the Rules in the Bellavance case had the equities failed-at that juncture defendant would
be entitled to a jury trial on the claim for damages for patent infringement. 98 But two trials would also have been necessary before.
In working out the problems incident to the pleadings of legal
counterclaims to equitable claims, an auspicious beginning was made
by Judge Coxe in Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger.9 Plaintiff
sought the cancellation and recission of a policy for false representations and warranties. In his answer the defendant counterclaimed
for the benefits under the policy. Before the new Rules, this would
have been the situation where defendant would have had the option
of bringing a separate action at law to recover the benefits or of pleading his claim as a counterclaim to the suit for rescission-in effect an
"equity merger". 10 0 If he chose the first alternative he of course would
have had the right of jury trial; if he chose the second, he would not. 1 1
And the same result should f6llow under the new Rules insofar as the
option is still left to a defendant to plead a counterclaim or institute
an independent action. But under Rule 13 (a), if the defendant's claim
"arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim", the defendant does not have the option
to bring a separate action: he must counterclaim or his right is barred
by res judicata.10 2 Nevertheless, the historic option to have a jury
trial or not must still be preserved. Thus, in the Burger case, on defendant's demand the court granted a jury trial on the counterclaim.
We have reserved for final consideration Ford v. C. E. Wilson &
Co. 10 because it so well illustrates the fact that even where there is a
complicated mixture of issues the "lay transaction" method of pleading
should not prevent the court from reaching a sound result. In the first
count the plaintiff alleged that he had a contract with the defendant
Wilson & Co. under which he was to deliver a large quantity of rose
bushes; and that after the deliveries had been completed and before
plaintiff had been paid under the contract, the defendant's bank, to
98. But in Scoville Mfg. Co. v. United States Elec. Mfg. Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv.

38a.3II, Case i (S. D. N. Y.

194o),

an accounting for damages for patent infringement

was ordered though the question of the right to equitable relief had become moot. It is
not apparent from the opinion that the matter of jury trial was in issue.
As to the plaintiff's right to a jury trial in an analogous situation (complaint

amended to change claim from equitable to legal), see Glauber v. Agee Dep't Stores,
2 Fed. Rules Serv. 38b.i2, Case i (W. D. Ky. 1939).
99. 27 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
ioO. See pp. 657-658 supra.
ioi. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 26o U. S. 360
(1922).

io2. See pp. 658-659 supra.
103. 30 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1939).
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secure loans made by it to Wilson & Co., took from it assignments,
pledges, and chattel mortgages, which made it impossible for defendant
to perform its contract with plaintiff. Thus the first count stated a factual picture from which there arose two claims: (i) a claim against
Wilson & Co. for breach of contract, and (2) a claim against the bank
for interference with contract.
In the second count certain relevant facts were incorporated from
the first count and it was further alleged that the security which the bank
took from Wilson & Co. and the control which was thereafter exercised over its business was kept secret for four months while plaintiff
continued to extend credit, with the result that the plaintiff was deceived,
defrauded and prevented from sharing in the assets-Wilson & Co.
being insolvent all the while and the bank knowing it. The second count
sought (i) damages against the bank for fraud, and (2) a decree setting aside the assignments as to the plaintiff, determining that the bank
held the proceeds of assigned accounts receivable as trustee for the
plaintiff and other creditors of Wilson & Co., and appointing a receiver.
It is important to note that here the division of subject-matter into
counts was not based upon the distinction between law and equity (two
legal claims being stated in the first count and one legal and one equitable
claim in the second) but rather upon factual grouping and convenience
of presentation-obviously the criteria intended by Rule Io (b). Yet
the court had not the slightest difficulty in working out a plan for
the trial, which guaranteed to the parties their constitutional rights.
The analysis of Judge Hincks is worthy of extended quotation, because
it displays not only full appreciation of the exact limits of the parties'
constitutional rights, but also an insight into practical trial administration:
. rule that all issues which are common to the legal causes
of action (in either count) and to the equitable cause stated in the
second count shall be tried together, the legal issues, of course, to
the jury and the equitable issues to the court; and that all equitable
issues which do not pertain to the legal causes shall be tried to the
court immediately following the jury trial.
"This ruling will have practical application as follows: On the
day of trial (November 20, 1939) the parties will proceed pre-

cisely as though trying to the jury both the first count and the second count viewed as charging actionable fraud, and the rulings on
the evidence will be made as though no other issues were before
the court. The court, however, will accept all evidence which is
received in the jury trial for any proper bearing it may have upon
the second count viewed as a cause of action in equity. After the
jury has been charged and has retired to deliberate, the court will
proceed to hear additional evidence on the equitable cause stated
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in the second count. There will be neither need nor permission to
reiterate evidence already received in the jury trial; but any evidence theretofore offered and excluded in the jury trial may again
be offered for its bearing on the second count viewed as a cause
of action in equity.
"The presiding judge will of course have discretion to await
a verdict of the jury before embarking upon a further hearing of
evidence on the equitable issues. As we have seen, a verdict against
the Bank might make it unnecessary to decide the equitable issues.
However, the parties should be in readiness to proceed forthwith
when the jury retired. For a defendant's verdict would apparently still leave open equitable issues, and the judge may feel that
it is better to take any additional evidence thereon forthwith, while
the parties and witnesses are in attendance, rather than to wait for
the verdict of the jury." 104
In short:
(i) The jury trial problem arises in but few cases.
(2) Other factors than the form of pleading are responsible for
most of the confusion in these few cases.
(3) "Lay transaction" pleading has little or no effect on the determination of the right to jury trial-to which the federal decisions
since the new Rules bear witness; and the little effect it may have in the
few cases involving the jury trial problem does not warrant the adoption of what in all other cases and for all other purposes is an undesirable form of pleading.
(4) The solution of the jury trial problem does not lie in a forced
construction of Rule io (b) to identify "transaction" with "claim".
(5) A solution will be found in the direction of a fuller use and
a closer articulation of the various trial-preparation steps afforded by
the new Rules: notice pleading, discovery, and the pre-trial hearing.
We rest our case.
io4. Id. at I65-x66.

